

119.2.22-2

AA_m. 601

Halskov, Søren

Sendt: 11. februar 2003 05:27 -
Til: UM - Komcenter (t)
Cc: milsek@fe-mail.dk; fe@fe-mail.dk; FMN - Comcen; Official Mailbox, Ankara Embassy; Official Mailbox, Beijing Embassy; Official Mailbox, Cairo Embassy; Official Mailbox, Damascus Embassy; Official Mailbox, Geneva FN Mission; Official Mailbox, Haag Embassy; Official Mailbox, Islamabad Embassy; Official Mailbox, London Embassy; Official Mailbox, Madrid Embassy; Official Mailbox, Mexico Embassy; Official Mailbox, Moscow Embassy; Official Mailbox, Oslo Embassy; Official Mailbox, Ottawa Embassy; Official Mailbox, Paris Embassy; Official Mailbox, Riyadh Embassy; Official Mailbox, Santiago Embassy; Official Mailbox, Sofia Embassy; Official Mailbox, Stockholm Embassy; Official Mailbox, Tehran Embassy; Official Mailbox, Tel Aviv Embassy; Official Mailbox, Vienna Embassy; Official Mailbox, Warsaw Embassy; Official Mailbox, Washington Embassy; Officiel Mailbox, Berlin Ambassade; Officiel Mailbox, Bryssel DANATO; Officiel Mailbox, EU Repræsentationen; stm@stm.dk; aki@fmn.dk; Braad, Michael; Christensen, Bertel Dons; Christensen, Jan Top; Christensen, Tomas Anker; Christiansen, Thure; Faaborg-Andersen, Lars; Geelan, Kirsten; Hahn, Henrik Bramsen; Hansen, Peter Lysholt; Hansen, Tina Alice; Hjortsø, Michael Just; Holm, Klavs A.; Horslund, Jens Otto; Jørgensen, Vibeke Rovsing (NY); Lassen, Christina Markus; Lauridsen, Morten Lykke; Løj, Ellen Margrethe; Lund-Sørensen, Thomas; Michelsen, Jette; Moesby, Ole; Mosgaard, Kurt; N.SP; N.USA; Olsen, Kasper Thams; Planck, Niklas; Riisgaard, Louise; S.FIN; S.HUM; S.MELA; Shine, Susanne; Sillasen, Grete; Søndergaard, Carsten; Staur, Carsten; Svensson, Nikolaj; Szczepanski, Pia Starbæk; Thygesen, Trine Rask; Ullerup, Ove; Wøggsborg, Niels Henrik; Zilmer-Johns, Michael; Vagthavende; NYCMISU, Archive; Jørgensen, Vibeke Rovsing (NY)
Emne: FN-Missionen New York MIS126 - Beskyttet. Irak. Projekt "Mirage" - et fransk non-paper. Instruktion. U118 .
AD ACTA: NYCMIS (t), Archive
Attention: Vagthavende + S.MELA
DeskBy: 7.30 for vagthavende
Formel E-post: Ja
Journalnr: 5.E.Irak
Klassifikation: UKLASSIFICERET
Personale indkaldes: Nej

Til: Udenrigsministeriet; milsek@fe-mail.dk; fe@fe-mail.dk; FMN - Comcen; Official Mailbox, Ankara Embassy; Official Mailbox, Beijing Embassy; Official Mailbox, Cairo Embassy; Official Mailbox, Damascus Embassy; Official Mailbox, Geneva FN Mission; Official Mailbox, Haag Embassy; Official Mailbox, Islamabad Embassy; Official Mailbox, London Embassy; Official Mailbox, Madrid Embassy; Official Mailbox, Mexico Embassy; Official Mailbox, Moscow Embassy; Official Mailbox, Oslo Embassy; Official Mailbox, Ottawa Embassy; Official Mailbox, Paris Embassy; Official Mailbox, Riyadh Embassy; Official Mailbox, Santiago Embassy; Official Mailbox, Sofia Embassy; Official Mailbox, Stockholm Embassy; Official Mailbox, Tehran Embassy; Official Mailbox, Tel Aviv Embassy; Official Mailbox, Vienna Embassy; Official Mailbox, Warsaw Embassy; Official Mailbox, Washington Embassy; Officiel Mailbox, Berlin Ambassade; Officiel Mailbox, Bryssel DANATO; Officiel Mailbox, EU Repræsentationen; stm@stm.dk; aki@fmn.dk; Braad, Michael; Christensen, Bertel Dons; Christensen, Jan Top; Christensen, Tomas Anker; Christiansen, Thure; Faaborg-Andersen, Lars; Geelan, Kirsten; Hahn, Henrik Bramsen; Hansen, Peter Lysholt; Hansen, Tina Alice; Hjortsø, Michael Just; Holm, Klavs A.; Horslund, Jens Otto; Jørgensen, Vibeke Rovsing (NY); Lassen, Christina Markus; Lauridsen, Morten Lykke; Løj, Ellen Margrethe; Lund-Sørensen, Thomas; Michelsen, Jette; Moesby, Ole; Mosgaard, Kurt; N.SP; N.USA; Olsen, Kasper Thams; Planck, Niklas; Riisgaard, Louise; S.FIN; S.HUM; S.MELA; Shine, Susanne; Sillasen, Grete; Søndergaard, Carsten; Staur, Carsten; Svensson, Nikolaj; Szczepanski, Pia Starbæk; Thygesen, Trine Rask; Ullerup, Ove; Wøggsborg, Niels Henrik; Zilmer-Johns, Michael; Vagthavende

FN-Missionen New York E-post MIS126 af 10. februar 2003 23:26:44

Desk By: 7.30 for vagthavende

J.nr.: 5.E.Irak

Beskyttet. Irak. Projekt "Mirage" - et fransk non-paper. Instruktion. U118 .

* Fra fransk og tysk side understregning af, at der alene er tale om et fransk non-paper (vedhæftet). Franskmændene begyndt at cirkulere til medlemmer af Sikkerhedsrådet mandag aften. Orienterede US - men ikke UK - allerede fredag.

* Reelt en uddybning af udenrigsminister Villepains forslag fra den 5. februar 2003. Længere tilstedeværelse af inspektører forudset. Har aldrig været hensigten at indsætte FN-fredsbevarende tropper ("blå-baretter").

* Gennem den russisk-fransk-tyske erklæring af d.d. udtrykker Tyskland støtte til de franske tanker.

2. Det franske "non-papers" hovedbudskaber

Hovedformålet med en styrkelse af inspektionsregimet er at forøge inspektionernes effektivitet. Det fastslås, at inspektionerne hele tiden har været tænkt som et "påtrængende" instrument med henblik på at sikre afskaffelsen af de forbudte irakiske våbenprogrammer. Inspektionerne må derfor gøres mere intensive, mere målrettede og mere påtrængende ("intrusive") for at fastholde presset på de irakiske myndigheder, så de ikke kan andet end at samarbejde aktivt og betingelsesløst.

Der foreslås forbedringer på følgende fire områder:

a. Styrkelse af inspektørernes antal og kompetencer

Inspektørernes geografiske dækning af landet skal forbedres for derved at sikre en effektiv afvæbning og inddæmning af irakerne samt forhindre forsøg på hemmeligholdelse af ulovlige våbenprogrammer. Konkret skal dette opnås ved:

- * Øge antallet af inspektører fra ca. 110 til mellem 240-360, dvs. en fordobling eller tredobling jf. Villepains tale i SC.
- * Personnellets sammensætning udvides til også at omfatte toldere, revisorer, arkivspecialister, translatører samt teknisk og administrativt støttepersonel med henblik på at forøge kompetencerne.
- * Indsættelse af flere vagtenheder til bl.a. at overvåge mistænkelige lokaliteter (sandsynligvis dette budskab, som fejlagtigt er blevet antaget som FN-tropper - "blå baretter") .
- * Etablering af mobile toldenheder til systematisk kontrol af varer og konvojer til Irak.
- * Etablering af et yderligere UNMOVIC-kontor i det vestlige Irak.

b. Styrkelse af tekniske ressourcer

- * Der skal sikres en permanent overvågning og inspektion af alle mistænkelige lokaliteter i Irak. Luftrekognoscering ville kunne forberede og støtte inspektørerne samt identificere irakiske forsøg på omgåelse, fx "oprydningsaktioner". Ud over USA's U2 rekognosceringsfly tilbyder Frankrig (Mirage IV), Rusland (Antonov) og Tyskland (droner) at stille hhv. rekognosceringsfly og droner til rådighed.
- * Derudover skal indsamlingen af data og efterretningsoplysninger sammenkøres effektivt på t



Irak Non-Paper
(Franske FN Mis...

ærs af bureauer og nationale efterretningstjenester. Det skal ske ved etablering af et fælles center/bureau til lettelse af dataindsamling og analyser for både UNMOVIC og IAEA i New York eller Wien.

c. Forbedring af metoder

* Der skal udarbejdes et klart, præcist og objektivt billede over de uafklarede spørgsmål vedrørende Iraks afvæbning. En tidsramme med frister for afklaringen af disse spørgsmål skal opstilles.

d. Placering af en koordinator i Bagdad

* Der skal udpeges en fast (FN)koordinator i Bagdad, der ud over at have det daglige ansvar for koordineringen af UNMOVIC's og IAEA's aktiviteter skal kunne virke som forbindelsesled til/samtalepartner med de irakiske myndigheder.

* * *

Indberetning om den videre procedure forudses efter HOMs mødet onsdag morgen.

Nikolaj Lomholt Svensson/Vibeke Rovsing Jørgensen, fg.

<<Irak Non-Paper (Franske FN Mission 10_2_2003).pdf>>

FN-Missionen New York MIS126

IRAQ

NON PAPER

SCR 1441 (2002) states in the preamble that the effective operation of UNMOVIC, as the successor organization to the Special Commission, and of the IAEA is essential for the implementation of SCR 687 and other relevant resolutions. In paragraph 7 it sets out a number of revised and additional rules to facilitate the inspectors' work in Iraq. The present organization of UNMOVIC is based on the organizational plan submitted to the Security Council on April 6, 2000 by Hans Blix in accordance with paragraph 6 of SCR 1284 and approved by the Council in a letter from its president to the Secretary-General on April 13, 2000. The plan (S/2000/292) itself provides, in paragraph 3, for the possible revision of the commission's structure and personnel according to developments and future needs.

The purpose in strengthening the regime is to increase the effectiveness of inspections: they must be more intensive, more carefully targeted, more intrusive. Our approach is based on the need to compel Iraq to cooperate by taking the peaceful approach of intrusive inspections. To do this, it is necessary for the inspections to be carried out to their logical end, with the political, technical and material support of member States. The idea is to make sure that the present system submits the Iraqi authorities to continued pressure, and that they have no choice other than to "cooperate immediately, unconditionally and actively" with the inspectors as required under SCR 1441. The inspections were designed from the outset as a necessary intrusive instrument to ensure the elimination of banned Iraqi programs. Their role has always been conceived as compelling the Iraqis to comply with their obligations.

1. Proposals

Strengthening Numbers and Diversifying Personnel

The objectives are to widen the geographic coverage of the country by increasing the number of inspectors in various parts of the territory, intensify the inspections (increasing the number and frequency of inspections), make them more intrusive, and lastly enable the inspectors to deal with sites that are widely spread out. The effectiveness of the inspections in terms of disarmament and containment would be increased. Such measures would make it much more difficult for Iraq to attempt any concealment.

There are about 110 UNMOVIC inspectors and nine IAEA inspectors in Iraq at this time. On average ten teams are in the field every day. So far, roughly half the designated sites have been inspected. If the number of inspectors is doubled (240) or tripled (360), then the number of daily inspections is doubled or tripled also.

Aside from doubling or tripling the number inspectors and inspections teams in the present specialties (chemical, biological, ballistic and nuclear weapons), other types of personnel and experts should be recruited:

- the security unit set up to protect the inspectors' facilities could be significantly reinforced so as to monitor certain suspicious sites or sites already inspected in cases where UNMOVIC and the IAEA believe it necessary. Such personnel could also intervene in the framework of

SCR 1441 which stipulates that the inspectors are authorized to freeze activity at a site, at least at the most extensive sites.

- To probe still further, UNMOVIC and the IAEA need not only arms experts but also experts in customs and accounting, archivists and other experts who can help improve their understanding of the nature of Iraqi proliferation programs on the basis of administrative, budgetary, financial and customs documents and archives, etc. An understanding of these aspects of Iraqi programs could allow UNMOVIC and the IAEA to proceed with more intrusive missions, including in archive centers.

- Administrative and technical support personnel and translators/interpreters to and from Arabic should be increased in proportion.

- Mobile customs teams should be established to check on the nature of goods entering Iraq and make sure there are no prohibited goods (military equipment barred under SCR 687 and dual-use goods included on the GRL and not approved by the 661 committee). Convoys would not be stopped systematically, but UNMOVIC could inspect cargos at will.

- UNMOVIC has a regional office at Mosul and will soon have one in Basra. Given the geographic distribution of the sites to be inspected, these two regional offices can cover the country well enough. An office in the west of the country would be useful nevertheless, particularly to serve as a base for the above-mentioned mobile customs units.

Strengthening Technical Resources

Aerial surveillance in particular must be increased. This would make it possible to conduct systematic sweeps over Iraqi territory and permanently monitor all the sites. Above all, the specific characteristics of each type of aircraft would make it possible to prepare and accompany inspections. They would enable UNMOVIC to promptly identify sites at which movements or changes may have been detected, and to send an inspection team immediately. Aerial reconnaissance would also ensure that once the inspectors have left a site it remains "frozen." Surveillance at that frequency would reveal any possible efforts at concealment.

The aim is also to facilitate data collection and processing from national intelligence services. UNMOVIC and IAEA officials responsible for collecting such data could be mandated by Mr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei to establish a joint center or bureau, organically attached to both UNMOVIC and the IAEA. The bureau could be located in New York (or Vienna). It would be authorized to request, receive and process data from (1) national intelligence services and (2) information collected by UNMOVIC aerial reconnaissance. The structure should be kept relatively light, made up of five to ten high-level experts, especially photo-analysts. At the same time, the services of member States would be invited to cooperate more closely among themselves and to systematically send information to the UNMOVIC and IAEA coordination center.

Enhancing Methods

The objective is to have UNMOVIC and the IAEA draw up a complete list of unresolved disarmament questions in order of importance. The idea is to have a clear, precise and objective picture of the problems that still have to be clarified. It is not only to identify completely all the remaining outstanding issues but also to evaluate their importance and

degree of priority. It is important to push the Iraqis up against a wall and not leave them any way out regarding the questions which they must answer and on which really active cooperation is expected. Such an exercise would also be useful in evaluating the nature of the threat Iraq represents.

The inspections should be organized and planned so as to move forward systematically in elucidating each of the outstanding questions. An order of priority needs to be established, along with a time-frame. A progress-report, or assessment of the lack of progress, in various identified areas should be made at regular intervals.

Placing a Coordinator in Iraq

Mr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei are not in Iraq all the time. It would be particularly useful for them to have a representative in Baghdad who could act as a relay for them and at the same time serve as an interlocutor with the Iraqi authorities on a day-to-day basis. Such a representative could also be responsible for coordinating UNMOVIC and IAEA activities on the spot. On a daily basis he would synthesize the questions and problems and liaise with the Iraqi authorities. He would be responsible for synthesizing the interim progress reports on each question at regular intervals.

2. Implementation

Our intention is to implement these proposals in close liaison with UNMOVIC and the IAEA. Naturally, the modes of application of these various proposals should be decided as a priority by Mr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei.

UNMOVIC and the IAEA have sufficient funding in reserve to strengthen the inspections mechanism as envisioned. UNMOVIC has accumulated resources from the two and half years it was in existence before the inspectors returned to Iraq, and during that period its expenditure was far less than its resources. The commission's account continues to be regularly funded as Iraq continues to export oil (0.8% of oil receipts paid into an escrow account).

With regard to personnel, the UNMOVIC roster lists about 350 experts, including the 110 inspectors already there. Rotations are currently planned every three months. Accordingly it is possible to double the inspection staff immediately by extending the length of stay and immediately mobilizing the rest of the experts on the list. The numbers could be tripled quickly as experts can be selected and trained without delay. Training sessions, by groups of 60, last from three to five weeks.

Regarding technical resources, several countries have announced they are ready to provide immediately additional reconnaissance aircraft. In addition to the U2s, the following are available: Russian Antonov, French Mirage IV and German drones.

ANNEXE

Excerpts from the French Foreign Minister's Remarks to the Security Council, February 5, 2003

"[To strengthen the inspections regime], we must define with Mr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei the requisite tools for increasing their operational capabilities:

- Let us double or triple the number of inspectors and open up new regional offices. Let us go further: could we not establish a specialized body to keep under surveillance the sites and areas already inspected?

- Let us substantially increase the capabilities for monitoring and collecting information on Iraqi territory. Here, France is ready to provide full support; it is ready to deploy Mirage IV reconnaissance aircraft;

- Let us collectively establish a coordination and data-processing center that would supply Mr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei, in real time and in a coordinated way, with all the intelligence resources they might need;

- Let us list the unresolved disarmament questions and rank them by importance;

- With the consent of the leaders of the inspections teams, let us define a demanding and realistic time-frame for moving forward in the assessment and elimination of the problems.

"This enhanced regime of inspections and surveillance could be usefully complemented by having a permanent UN coordinator for Iraq's disarmament, stationed over there and working under the authority of Mr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei."